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IN THE SUPREME COUR
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
PIONEER SA'r-INGS 11ND LOAN
ASSOCIATION, a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

PI 0 NEE R

}"'lNAI~CE

..t\ N D
'l,HRI}__,T COMP .L-\NY and PIONEER FINANCE .1\.ND 'l,HRIF'l.,

Case No.
10227

COMPANY OF SALT LAKE
CITY, UTAH,
DefendanJs an.d Appella·nts.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

Appellants' state1nent of the kind of case is accurate.

In the lower court the Judge entered a decree
permane11tly enjoining the defendants from using the

1
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name Pioneer Finance and Thrift Company or any
similar name which 1nay be confused with the name
Pioneer Savings and Loan Association in carrying on
an industrial loan business within the limits of the
Sugarhouse trade area. The Decree was entered on the
plaintiff's (respondent's) n1otjon for summary judgment based upon the pleadings in the case and on. the
discovery proceedings of record (R 21) and further
based upon the agreement of the parties at the pretrial and there were no disputed items of fact left which
could become the subject of an adversary proceeding
and that only matters of law re1nained to be determined (R 36).

RELIEF SOUGH'!, ON APPEAL
The defendant seeks to reverse the Judgment of
the lower court. The plaintiff asks only that the J udgInent of the lower court be affirmed.

STATE~IENT

OF FACTS

The plaintiff corporation was organzied and incorporated on the 4th day of March, 1954 and shortly
thereafter was authorized by the Banking Department
of the State of Utah to carry on and conduct a business
as a savings and loan association. It commenced the
operation of. its business as a savings and loan association at 1045 East 21st South, Salt Lake City~ Utah

2
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under the nan1e and style of Pioneer Savings and Lo,
Association on the 28th day of April, 1955 and eve~
since said date has continued to carry on such businessl
at that address. The said address, 1045 East 21st South
Street, is within the corporate lirnits of Salt Lake City
and is also within a particular economic trade and business area of Salt Lake City known as "Sugarhouse."
Defendant, Pio11eer }'inance and Thrift Company,
'vas incorporated on October 21, 1953 under the name
of Pioneer Industrial I_Joan Company, its name being
changed to Pioneer Finance and Thrift Company on
June 15, 1955. Pioneer Finance and Thrift Company
is also a successor company to Pioneer Finance Corporation, which was incorporated on June 29, 1948
and operated in Richfield, Utah and vicinity. Pioneer
Finance Corporation was consolidated with Pioneer
Finance and Thrift Company by agreement of merger
on November 17, 1956.
Pioneer Finance and 'fhrift Company of Salt Lake
City was incorporated May 14, 19!18. However, business was conducted in Salt Lake City and a loan license
was issued July 1, 1955 under the name of Pioneer
Finance and 'l.,hrift Company. Business is and has been
conducted in Salt Lake County, State of Utah by the
defendants under the names and during the tirnes and
at the addresses as follows:
a. Pioneer Finance and 'fhrift Company, 434 I~ast
4th South, Salt Lake City, Utah. Business commenced
July 1, 1955. 'l.,he same business was continued at the

3
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same address under the na1ne of Pioneer Finance and
'fhrift Company of Salt Lake from May 14, 1958.

b. Pioneer Finance Corporation, 29 East Center,
Midvale, Utah co1nmenced business on August 9, 1951.
Business was conducted at 53 East Center, Midvale,
Utah under the name of Pioneer Industrial Loan Coinpany, and is now conducted under the na1ne of Pioneer
Finance and Thrift Company of Midvale. 'fhis is the
only ·place in Salt Lake County where defendants'
operation pre-dated plaintiff's operation.
c. Pioneer Finance and 'l,hrift Company, Deseret
Building, Salt Lake City, Utah from November 17,
1956.
d. Pioneer Construction Company, Deseret Building, Salt Lake City, Utah, August 3, 1959. (R 9, 10
and 11}.
During the year 1964 the defendants commenced
the construction of a building at 1025 East 21st South
Street in Salt Lake City, Utah, said address being on
the same side of the street as the principal place of
business of plaintiff at 1045 East 21st South Street
and less than 100 feet physically removed fro1n said
place of business of the plaintiff. Defendant conten1plated operation of an industrial loan company at said
address under the style of Pioneer Finance and 1'hrift
Company.
Both the plaintiff and the defendants had served
interrogatories and each had answered under oath the

4
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interrogatories required to be answered, which ans\\.
were a part of the files at the time the motion for sun_ .
mary jt1dgment was considered. Both the plaintiff and'
the defendants filed motions for summary judgment,
each stating that their motions "will be based upon the
pleadings and the discovery proceedings now of record''
(R 21, 22).
The respective n1otions for summary judgment
were heard by the Court, the Honorable Marcellus K.
Snu\v sitting, at ·which time each counsel moved for
their respective summary judgments, "agreeing and
admitting that there were no disputed items of fact
left which could become the subject of an adversary
proceeding, and that the only matter left was the matter of law to be presented by each counsel ... " ( R 36) .
The lower court entered an order granting plaintiff's
motion for Summary Judgment and denying defendants' motion. 'I11ereafter, the lower court entered its
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and a Decree
permanently enjoining the defendants from using the
name Pioneer }..,inance and 'I'hrift Company or any
similar name which may be confused with the name
Pioneer Savings and Loan Association in carrying on
and conducting an industrial loan business within the
limits of the Sugarhouse trade area.

5
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ARGUMENT
I

THE },INDINGS OF, F,AC'l, ENTERED BY
'rHE DIS'l,RIC'f COUR'l" WERE AMPLY SUPPORTED BY THE E';IDENCE, ANS\VERS
TO INTERROGA'fORIES, PLEADINGS AND
ADMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES.
·Defendants complain that some of the Findings
of Fact were based upon answers to interrogatories
already on file and state that "had the plaintiff supported its motion for Summary Judgment . by notice
that it intended to use the answers made by it to interrogatories already on file as an Affidavit in support
of its motion, the defendants would have filed opposing
Affidavits ... " Surely the plaintiff could have given
no clearer notice that it intended to use said answers
than it gave in its notice of the motion when it stated
that it would be ''based upon the pleadings in the case,
and on the discovery · proceedings now of record"
(R 21).
It appears that the defendants were willing that
the matter be deter1nined on the basis of the information
contained in the answers for each party to the interraga tories and of the facts set forth in the pleadings,
when it agreed with the Court that there 'vere no
material disputed items of fact. But, when the Court,
in considering all the facts and the law, determined
that the plaintiff was entitled to judgment, the defendants now wish to back up from their previous

6
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admissions and position and say that such agree~
'vas intended to apply only if the court should ruh
in their favor. Such purely should not be countenance~
'fhis is particularly true when we examine the Inatters concerning which the defendant makes the most
objection. Defendant objects that there was not intro~
duced in evidence, except through the pleadings and
through the answers to interrogatories, information as
to the date of incorporation of the plaintiff company.
Surely, this is a matter of public record and we believe
the defendants oug·ht not in good faith be heard to
complain about a finding as to a matter so easily ascertainable, and one which, had request for admission been
made, would surely have had to be admitted.
Futhermore, as to the question of the trade area
of operation of the plaintiff corporation, through its
priority of establishment in that area, the defendants
complain that the only evidence as to what contemplates
the Sugarhouse area is that contained in the answers
to the interrogat~ries.
It would appear that the Court sitting in the Third
District in Salt Lake County could take judicial notice
of what generally composes the area known as "Sugarhouse." Surely the Court can take judicial notice of
the fact that the establishment of a new business within
100 feet of an old, long established business is 'vithin
the confines of the trade area served by that old established business. A_s stated by this Court in Little Cot-

7
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lonwood fVater Cornpany vs. Kimball~ 76 Utah 2·t3,
267, 289 P. 116, " . . . a Court is presumed to kuo"~

wl1at every man of ordinary intelligence must kno\v
about such things."
· Had the defendants in fact filed Affidavits denying the date of incorporation of the plaintiff and its
date of cotninencing business at its address in Sugarhouse, in opposition to the Inatters set forth in the
answers under oath to interrog·atories, it would appear
that such Affidavits would have been made in bad faith
and should have been treated as such under the provisions of Rule 58 (g) of the Utah Rules of Civil l~ro
cedure.
In Co1nmercial Credit Corporatio~n vs. California
tllhipbuilding Corporation~ DC Cal. 1947, 71 l~~eu.
Supp, 936, it was held that 'vhere parties admit that
there are no genuine issues as to any material fact,
sununary judgment 1nay be granted in favor of a defendant even on the plaintiff's tnotion for sum1nary
judgment. In the case of Greenlaw vs. Rodick ( l\Iaine
1962) 186 Fed. 529, it was held that plaintiff's answers
to interrogatories (even thought not under oath) could
be relied upon by the plaintiff itself in opposition to
a motion for summary judgtnent.
']]1e whole logic of the situation is simply this,
that where statements are made under oath by parties
and a motion is 1nade for sutnmary judgment and each
party is put specifically on notice that the staten1ents
so made under oath~ 'vhether by answer to interroga-

8
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tories, or otherwise, · will be relied upon in support
\
the n1otio11 for su1n1nary judgment, then it is incuinbeti, .,,
upon any party intending to dispute or controvert such
allegations under oath to present evidence or other
contradictory infor1nation specifically negativing any
such allegations.
If defendant's intended to controvert the facts,
they should have so advised the Court and the plaintiff.
lrnder the representations n1ade by counsel (R 36)
the Court had no alternative than to grant surmnary
judgment for either plaintiff or the defendants.
In U.S. vs. l(a·nsas Gas and Electric (}ompwny
( CA lOth Cir.) 287 l~ed 2d 601, considering Federal
Rule 56 relating to 1notions for summary judgment,
it 'vas held that the ans,ver of the plaintiff to interrogatories of the defendant should be properly considered
in opposition to a motion of the defendant for sumn1ary
judgment. In other words, that the answers of a party
should be considered in its favor, as well as against it,
in a 1notion for stunmary judg1nent. The court stateu
that the ans,vers of the defendant to the interrogatories
of the plaintiff were substantial statements of material
facts which the court "'as not only entitled, but was
required to consider.
It is not the purpose for which an affidavit or
answer under oath is filed in an action which deterJnine whether or not the same may be used in connection
'vith a motion for summary judgment. It is the substance thereof and the fact that, having been made

9
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under oath and under a compulsion to set forth the
facts as they are known accurately to exist, that the
statement was made a part of the record. Barron and
Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure, Volume 3,
Section 1236, states:
"Affidavits are not required by th-e rule and
their absence will not prevent summary judgment if the other 1natters shown on the motion
are sufficient. The affidavit of a party on file in
the case will be considered regardless of the
purpose for which it was filed."
Section 1239 of that same volume states:
"It frequently happens that both sides will
agree that there are no fact issues, and will join
in the request that the case be decided, for one
side or the other, on the basis of a motion for
judgment made by one of the parties. In such
a situation grant of judgment for the technically
nonmoving party is plainly proper."
Such being the rule, surely when both parties have
agreed that there are no issues of fact and join in a
request that the case be decided,and when both have
made motions for summary judgment, it is proper for
the Court to grant such a motion upon the basis of
the facts before it.
In Albert vs. McGrath_, 104 Fed. Supp. 891 (DC
Cal. 1952) in discussing summary judgments, the
Court stated that "the object of the rule per1nitting
sumn1ary judgment is to allow summary disposition of
cases ,vhich, on the face of the co1nplaint and of addi-

lO
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'

'

tional facts appearing from supporting docume...show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact'.
to be tried; and in determining the matter, resort is~
had to extrinsic facts throug·h affidavits, admissions "'
a.nd the like. 'fhis in1plies that a finding of absence
of a genuine issue as to any n1aterial fact will be made,
despite the fact that the pleadings, as they stand, present such an issue. (Citing cases) . When the factual
issue is simple and can be determined by the Court
without choosing between conflicting views, summary
judgment is proper." 'l'he factual sitation in the case
at bar is simple and the parties having agreed that
there were no genuine issues of material facts, the
Court was surely justified on the basis of the facts
before it in entering sumn1ary judgment for the planitiff.
A review of the files and pleadings of the action
will amply support the findings of fact made by the
Court in support of its summary judgment in favor of
the plaintiff herein.

II
PLAIN'l,IF~F,-RESJ?ONllENT

HAD ESTABLISHED PRIORI'l~Y OF RIGHT TO 'filE
NAME "PIONEER" IN 'fHE SUGARHOUSE
TRADE AREA.
There is a division of authority among the st ates in
this country as to whether or not a company can acquire

11
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a property right in a generic name such as "Pioneer,"
so that it may invoke the law in protecting such a
right. In the case of Budget System Incorporated v.
Budget Loan and Finance Plan_, 12 Utah 2d. 18; 361
P.2d 512, the Supreme Court of the State of Utah
decidedin accordance with the majority rule, that there
is such a property right, and that courts of equity, if
called upon, will protect it. On the basis of these cases,
it seems clear that the word "Pioneer" in the name is
such a term as will be protected by law if a competing
firm uses it in such a way that it may confuse the
public or injure the firm first using the name in a given
trade area.
Among other cases in which relief was granted to
the first party using a trade name in a certain trade
area are the following:

Atlas Assurance Company-Atlas Insurance Company~ 112 N.W. 232; Iowa Auto Market-Auto Market and Exchange~ 197 N.W. 312; Buick Motor Co.Buick Used Motors~ 229 N.Y. Supp. 3; N.M._; Newco1ner Company-Newcomer-'s New Store_, 217 S.W.
822; Albany Savings Banl{;-Albany City Savings Bank~
190 N.Y. Supp. 334, both banks located in the same
city; International Trust Company-Internatio1~al Loan
and Trust Company~ 26 N.E. 693, Mass.; B. Forman
Cornpany-Forma1~ Manufacturing Company~ Inc.~
125 N.Y. Supp. 597. Here both companies dealt in
the retailing of furs and the second company proposed
to establish its store only a few doors distance from

12
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that of the first company. [(ansas City Real Estal
and Stock Exchange-l(ansas (}ity Real Estate Excha.nge_, 5 S.W. 29; Lamb [(nit Goods Company-Lamb
Glove and Mitten Company_, 78 N.W. 1072. ~-,actories
here were located in different towns, but the business
was done mainly through agents, and there were many
instances of confusion; McFall Electric Co.-Mcll'all
Electric and 'l"elephone C"o._, 110 Ill. App. 182; Planters) Fertilizer & Phosphate Co.-Planters"' Fertilizer Co._,
133 S.E. 706; Van Aucken Steam Specialty Co.-Van
Aucken ( ompany_, 57 Ill. All. 240; Empire Trust Company-Empire Finance_ C"or]Joration) 41 S.W. 2d 847;
American Radio Store Inc.-American Radio & Television Stores Corp.) 17 Del. 127, 150 A. 180, where the
court observed that the words "radio" and "stores"
were purely descriptive and so not appropriable, but
the addition of the word '~America11" was a distinguishing mark, in the use of which claimant was entitled to be protected. Personal Finance (}ompany of
Lincoln-Personal Loan Service) 275 N.W. 324, Nebr.;
Standard Oil (Yo. of Calif.-Standard Oil Co. of New
Mexico_, 56 F.2d 973, CCA lOth. 'l~he Court observed
that there could be no doubt that if defendant were
permitted to engage in the petroleum business, third
persons would deal with defendant thinking they were
dealing with plaintiff; Standard Oil Co. of New Y O'rh"Standard Oil Co. of Maine_, 45 F. 2d 309, CCA I.
1

In the case of Sec1trit~J Title Insurance Agency
v. ,Yecurity Title Insurance Company_, 15 Utah 2nd

13
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93, 387 P. 2d 691, this Court also held that the names
were sufficiently similar to cause confusion and that
the first company using the name in the given trade
area could protect it by injunctive proceedings.

Under the decided cases the question of which
corporation was prior in point of time in registering
the na1ne with the Secretary of State or other public
officers, does not seem to be controlling. 'l"'he crucial
matter is which of the fir1ns first used the name in commerce in a given trade area. For example, in the lower
court, in the case of Budget System Incorporated v.
Budget Loan & Finance Plan_, supra_, the Court found
that:
" 'Budget' in defendant's name has caused and
will continue to cause confusion and deception
to the public in the Salt Lake City area among
present and potential customers therein."
Again the Supreme Court in this case says:
"By its findings the trial court seems justified
because of the first two of the stated theories in
concluding that plaintiff has acquired a right to
exclusive use of the word "Budget" in the finance
business in this locality.-'-' (Emphasis added).
We will concede that the defendants were the first
to use the term "Pioneer" in their title (although a
different title than they now use) in Salt Lake County.
They had an industrial loan operation in Midvale. The
question to be determined under this section, therefore,
is whether or not Midvale and Sugarhouse are in the
sa1ne "locality" or "trade area, as the term is used in

14
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the decided cases. In a Yery recent case, Seegmiller v.
H,unt~ 15 Utah 2nd 269, 391 P. 2d 298, the Supreme\J·
Court of Utah stated:
·
:·.(.
"'l,he Court has recognized the principle that
equity will protect a trade name in the area which
is coextensive with its reputation. The extent of
this area and its boundaries is a question of fact
rather than law.''

'~

What are the agreed facts in regard to the Sugarhouse area and the l\1idvale area, and what are the
facts which the Court could know and consider as a
rna tter of common know ledge?
As hereinabove stated, the Court is presumed to
know what every man of ordinary intelligence must
know. 'fhe Court knows and the answers to interrogatories substantiate that Sugarhouse is located within
the corporate limits of Salt Lake City. It is a shopping
or trade area on East 21st South in Salt Lake City,
which is highly commercialized and which is insulated
from other trade areas by a residential area ( R 15) .
The Court can know as a matter of common knowledge
that Sugarhouse is separated from Midvale by approximately ten miles. Furthermore, there are intervening
between them a number of shopping or trade areas,
surrounded by residential areas. There is no cotnmunity of economic interest between Midvale and Sugar .
house. In its answers to supplemental interrogatories,
the plaintiff states that the great majority of its 2160
accounts which it services from its Sugarhouse office

15

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Service
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

would reside in the area bounded as follows: South
of 13th South, North of 4800 South and East of 7th
East (R 19). The individuals residing in this area
would seldom, if ever, have occasion to conduct business
in .NI~dvale. It also appears from these interrogatories
that the plaintiff has limited its direct mail advertising
campaigns to those residing 'vithin a three mile radius
of its Sugarhouse offiee ( R 20) . 'l"'he individuals who
would be doing business of a financial nature in Sugarhouse are almost entirely distinct from those who would
be doing a similar type business in Midvale. There
can be no question but that if the plaintiff atte1npted
to open a savings and loan branch adjacent to the
defendants Midvale office under the name of Pioneer
Savings & Loan Association, the defendants would
be entitled to injunctive relief as having first used the
nan1e Pioneer in the Midvale trade area.

III

THE BUSINESS ACTIVITIES OF THE
PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANT ARE SO
SIMILAR AS TO BE CONFUSING AND MISLEADING TO THE PUBLIC.
In their brief the defendants take the position that
the nature of the business carried on by the plaintiff
and the defendants are so dissimilar that ·no confusion
in the minds of the public can result. The very fact,
however, that the defendants have to strain so hard
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on this point indicates the confusion that will result.
It is true, as the defendants' brief points out, that
different statutory sections authorize the organization
of and define the powers of building and loan associations than those governing industrial loan corporations.
However, the average citizen does not even have access
to a set of the Utah statutes, much less is he inclined
to read them. Therefore, this distinction is a meaningless distinction 'vhich would certainly not have the
effect of differentiating the activities of the two con1panies in the public mind. The same thing can be said
for the distinction which the defendants attempt to
draw on the basis of the different amounts of authorized
loans which may be made by savings and loan corporations and industrial loan companies. The fact remains,
however, that the plaintiff and the defendants are both
engaged in the business of taking deposits from the
public and making loans to the public, and particularly
in the field of taking deposits is it probable that the
public could be mislead to its detriment. Industrial
loan companies typically pay higher interest rates on
their deposits than do savings and loan associations,
which they have to do to try to attract capital because
of the greater stability of savjngs and loan associations.
A member of the public might well be mislead, in this
instance, in making a deposit with the defendant companies at their higher rate of interest, to believe that
he was getting the security of a savings and loan conlpany deposit.
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It is not necessary under the decided cases that the
business of the companies involved be identical. 'l"hey
may merely be so similar in 11ature as to give rise to
the probability of confusion. 'fhe following language
is found in the Security Title case, supra:
"Although appellant is a title insurer and not
in the business of abstracting and exa1nining
land titles in this state, nevertheless, the business
activities of respondents and appellant are so
closely related that unfair activities can have a
deleterious effect. 'l,his is so because respondents'
and appellant's services are connected with land
titles, and the customer's ultimate need is supplied by the same type of preliminary service
as to title."
In thise case, as pointed out above, both the -plaintiff and the defendants are engaged in taking deposits
and making loans. In other words, of meeting the financial needs of the public, both as to investment and as
to the obtaining of financing. While a trained legal
mind may well be able to differentiate between the two
types of activities, the average person desiring to deposit his money on interest, or the average person desiring to make a loan will not so differentiate.

18

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Service
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

CONCLUSION
We respectfully submit that the Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law of the lower court were amply
supported by the evidence, pleadings and admitted
facts and that such judgment shoudl be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

ZAR E. HAYES
PUGSLEY,HAYES,RAMPTON
& WATKISS
600 El Paso Natural Gas Building

Salt Lake City, Utah

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Service
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

